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  1 INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE:  
LEVELS VERSUS CATCHING UP AND FRONTIER SHIFTS 
 
Abstract: 
We analyze the relationship between institutional infrastructure (capturing political stability, quality of 
government and social infrastructure) and overall country productivity for a sample of 57 (OECD and non-
OECD) countries. Specifically, we compare empirical results for alternative productivity measures: output 
per worker and total factor productivity (TFP); in addition, we consider both levels and changes, where we 
decompose TFP changes into efficiency changes and technical changes. This gives us insight into the 
different channels through which the institutional infrastructure impacts on overall productivity 
performance: the ‘accumulation’ of production factors versus the ‘accommodation’ of production factors, 
and the ‘shifting’ of the world productivity frontier versus the ‘catching up’ with this frontier. In line with 
the existing literature, our results suggest a substantial accumulation effect: good institutions enhance 
capital accumulation. In addition, we find significant evidence in favor of an accommodation effect (in 
terms of both levels and changes), which elicits institutional quality as a ‘lubricant’ of the economic 
system: good institutions facilitate complex transactions, specialization and flexibility while reducing 
transaction costs. Interestingly, we find that good institutions enhance technical change as well as 
efficiency change.  
Conveniently, the decomposition of TFP change also allows us to interpret the convergence issue, for 
which largely inconclusive evidence is obtained on the basis of a combined TFP measure. Our findings 
reveal that efficiency change is associated with convergence, i.e., countries with lower initial productivity 
realize higher productivity growth through catching up. By contrast, technical change corresponds to 
divergence, i.e., countries with higher initial productivity succeed in higher productivity growth through 
shifts of the technological frontier. One possible rationalization is that greater experience with 
technological innovation (i.e., a closer situation to the world technology frontier) benefits the 
implementation of new products and processes (i.e., the cost of additional innovations falls). 
 
Keywords: institutions; productivity measurement; convergence 
  2 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Why can some countries show a prominent and persistent track-record of economic prosperity while others 
can not or to a lesser extent? Standard growth theory identifies the accumulation of physical capital, 
investment in human capital and (endogenous) technological progress as driving forces behind aggregate 
production. But then the question remains: why do some countries invest more in skills and equipment than 
others? Or, given the accumulated stock of human and physical capital, why do some countries succeed in 
a more efficient use of the existing factors of production, thus raising productivity?  Recent research 
investigates the ‘deep determinants’ of output growth, such as institutions, international trade and 
geography.  In a stimulating paper, Rodrik et al. (2002) claim that the quality of institutions ‘trumps’ 
everything else.  The title of their paper is outspoken and challenging: “Institutions rule: the primacy of 
institutions over geography and integration in economic development”. Sachs (2001) and Gallup et al. 
(1998) question the primacy of institutions and favor geography. Recent research in the camp of 
international trade includes Frankel and Romer (1999); see Baldwin (2003) for a survey of this empirical 
literature. Acemoglu et al. (2001) provide an interesting contribution linking actual institutions to earlier 
colonial regimes, which in turn are shaped by geography (tropical diseases). 
 
In this paper we focus on the role of institutions. The study of the impact of institutional arrangements on 
economic performance goes to the very heart of political economy, and has again become topical in the 
economic literature since the seminal paper of Barro (1991). Since then, an important strand of literature 
has moved into the direction of the institutional features of countries. A multitude of quality indicators for 
institutional infrastructure has been under empirical investigation. See, among many others, Mauro (1995), 
Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997), Easterly and Levine (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Knack and Zak (2001) 
and Olsson and Hibbs (2002). Broadly defined, the institutional infrastructure of a country refers to the set 
of arrangements that shape the ‘rules of the game’ and the incentives for the economic agents. Clearly, 
private individuals and firms figure as agents but also as public servants and politicians. These incentives 
can encourage productive activities such as the accumulation of skills, investments in physical capital and 
also the development of product- and process-innovations. On the other hand, the institutional setting may 
  3 give leeway to predatory behavior (theft, rent-seeking, corruption, …) which Hall and Jones (1999) label as 
‘diversion’. A favorable institutional infrastructure rewards productive efforts and suppresses diversion. 
This requires a clear definition of property rights, maintenance of law and order, a correct civil service, 
absence of corruption, political stability, … 
 
A starting point for our analysis is provided by the recent work of Easterly and Levine (2001), who review 
different studies on the causes of growth. Basically, these authors find that factor accumulation alone does 
not suffice as an explanation for observed growth patterns. Rather, they indicate differences in total factor 
productivity (TFP, which relates total output to total labor and capital input) as the main reason for 
variation in output growth. Their general conclusion is that the examination of variation in TFP, i.e. the 
variation in prosperity that cannot be assigned to differences in labor and capital input, constitutes a most 
rewarding avenue for further research. 
 
We empirically investigate the impact of the institutional infrastructure on TFP outcomes. But, deviating 
from the mainstream literature, our focus is not so much on the institutional indicators that we use, but on 
the measures employed for capturing TFP. Interestingly, and as we will explain in greater detail below, our 
TFP measures allow us to disentangle two ‘channels’ through which institutions can impact on total factor 
productivity, viz.: 
- The  ‘factor accumulation’ effect; i.e., the fact that good institutions enhance factor accumulation. For 
example, we can reasonably expect that a favorable institutional infrastructure will foster investments 
in human capital and increase the stock of physical capital both from investments at home and from 
abroad. 
- The  ‘factor accommodation’ effect; this refers to the role of institutions as the ‘lubricant’ of the 
economic system. Good institutions can be expected to improve the efficient use of the available stock 
of the production factors (capital and labor). Loosely put, good institutions ‘grease the wheels’ of the 
economic system. They accommodate economic exchanges with ‘saving’ in terms of transaction costs 
and diversion. Good institutions facilitate complex transactions, specialization and flexibility while 
reducing transaction costs in the sense of the costs of the economic system. This is especially apparent 
  4 in the literature on (asymmetric) information, incentives and contracts, which explicitly recognizes the 
role of institutions as setting the ‘rules of the game’.
1 The functioning of good institutions in terms of 
reducing transaction costs and diversion also shows from their interpretation as a society’s ‘social 
capital’, a concept that has become popular, also in economics, since the influential publications of 
Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995).
2 
 
The aforementioned empirical studies have commonly focused on the combined accumulation and 
accommodation effects of the institutional infrastructure. This is most obvious for studies that relate GDP 
growth to institutions; the sole attention for output increase ignores the institutional impact in terms of 
input augmentation. But the same applies for studies that concentrate on GDP per worker ratios. By 
considering only the labor input, this measure partially captures overall TFP, and the associated 
institutional effect incorporates not only the factor accommodation channel but also the fact that good 
institutions augment investments (i.e., the factor accumulation channel). Indeed, the accumulation effect 
can be expected to work primarily through capital stock enlargement.  
 
Our analysis ambitions to isolate the factor accommodation effect. To single out this effect, we use a TFP 
measure that takes into account both the capital stock and the labor stock. In other words, the accumulation 
effect is already captured in the TFP measure itself. The measure was first proposed by Färe et al. (1994). 
It compares each country to a (non-parametrically constructed) ‘world productivity frontier’. The distance 
from that frontier then provides a proxy for the (relative) productivity level of each country within a 
particular year. Intertemporal changes of this frontier-distance represent (relative) productivity change. 
Interestingly, this approach allows us to decompose overall productivity growth into ‘efficiency change’ 
and ‘technical change’.
3 The efficiency change component indicates how much closer a country gets to the 
                                                            
1 For example, Hargreaves (1994) points out the growing appreciation that many economic interactions take the form 
of the three classic games (prisonner’s dilemma, coordination and chicken), and that the institutional environment 
often affects the outcomes of these games.  
2 For example, the World Bank defines social capital as “the institutions, relationships and norms that shape the 
quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions” (see http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/whatsc.htm). 
This definition directly relates social capital to the factor accommodation effect discussed in this study. 
3 In his review paper, Hulten (2000; p. 25) stresses this as an important advantage of the approach followed here. 
  5 world frontier over time (i.e., ‘catching up’), while the technical change component indicates productivity 
growth due to world frontier (technological) shifts (i.e., ‘innovation’). 
 
Our empirical analysis covers TFP changes (overall change, catching up and technical change) as well as 
TFP levels. Some authors (e.g., Hall and Jones (1999)) argue that the focus on TFP levels is more 
appropriate for studying the impact of the institutional infrastructure (e.g., claiming that levels better 
capture differences in long-run economic performance). We deliberately abstract from that discussion, and 
we consider both levels and changes in our empirical analysis. In both cases, we compare the results for 
our TFP measure with those for the more conventional GDP per worker ratio. From our above argument 
we expect that this will suggest a stronger effect of good institutions on GDP per worker than on TFP. Our 
empirical findings should thus indicate whether there is evidence for an accommodation effect in addition 
to the accumulation effect. Also, they should give us insight into the relative importance of both effects: in 
the first case the relation adds the accommodation effect to the accumulation effect, while in the second 
case only the accommodation effect is at play. Finally, given our specific TFP change measure, we can 
isolate the importance of the institutional infrastructure for respectively catching up and technological 
change. 
 
Along the way, this approach allows us to check empirically (cross-country) convergence for the two 
components of TFP change (technical change and catching up). As it stands now, convergence theories and 
empirical evidence provide confusing conclusions; see, e.g., Temple (1999) and de la Fuente (2002) for 
recent reviews of the literature. It appears that different patterns emerge: some rich countries succeed in 
permanent growth while others rather stagnate, whereas some poor countries do catch up while others 
further deteriorate. Intuitively, in terms of our TFP change decomposition we can expect two mechanisms 
at play. Firstly, a higher initial TFP implies lesser capacity for catching up; i.e., the more productive 
country is situated closer to the world frontier, the less productive country can benefit from technological 
diffusion. Secondly, a higher initial TFP may well entail higher capacity for innovation as the return on 
R&D investments is an increasing function of scientific experience with innovative activities. The 
combination of this ‘convergence’ (through catching up) and ‘divergence’ (through innovation) effect can 
  6 explain the existing inconclusive evidence. Our TFP change decomposition in catching up and frontier 
shifts allows for investigating that explanation (while controlling for the quality of the  institutional 
framework). 
 
In the next section, we briefly review the adopted approach to measuring TFP (levels and changes). Section 
3 presents our empirical results. Section 4, finally, summarizes and provides some further discussion of our 
results. 
 
  7 2. MEASURING PRODUCTIVITY: A NON-PARAMETRIC APPROACH  
 
Productivity essentially pertains to the transformation of total input into total output. The rate of 
transformation represents the productivity level; productivity change indicates variation in the productivity 
levels over time. Our following exposition focuses on two consecutive years, which we denote as year 0 
and year 1. Specifically, we discuss measures for the productivity level in both years and measures for the 
productivity change between both years; and we follow Färe et al. (1994) in decomposing productivity 
change into ‘catching up’ (or efficiency change) and ‘technical change’ (or innovation-driven change). We 
will assume perfect information about technology and prices when introducing the measures. In a further 
step, we turn to approximating the ‘true’ productivity value when such perfect information is not available, 
as is typically the case in practical applications (including our own; see Section 3). 
 
We use the following notation: T  represents the (closed and non-empty) production possibility set as 
defined by the technology in the year k (k = 0,1);   stands for the output vector and   for the input 
vector in k, the (non-negative) input-output quantity vector is  ;   and   are the corresponding 
(relative) output and input price vectors, the (non-negative) input-output price vector is  . In our 
empirical application,   is the aggregate GDP level (i.e.,   is a scalar), and the TFP input vector   

















2.1 PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS 
 





4 See Diewert and Nakamura (2002, 2003) for extensive reviews of productivity measures. 









This measure divides output value by input value and can be interpreted as ‘return-to-the-dollar’ (see, e.g., 
Georgescu-Roegen (1951, p. 103)).
5 
 
In the following we will focus on ‘relative’ productivity levels or ‘efficiency’ levels, which are computed 
as the ratio of the actual (‘absolute’) TFP level as defined in (1) over the maximally attainable TFP level 
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, i.e., the maximum TFP level is effectively attained and the input-output 
combination   is ‘efficient’ with respect to the possibility set T . Generally, the value of   
captures the relative ‘distance’ of   from the technological productivity frontier associated with 
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In our next discussion of productivity changes, we will also use relative productivity levels as defined with 



















  9  
Obviously, since   does not necessarily belong to T , the relative measure   need not be 







2.2  PRODUCTIVITY CHANGES 
 
Productivity change measures capture variation in the productivity level between 0 and 1. In the following 
















   =
   









Avoiding an arbitrary base of comparison, this measure is computed as the geometric mean of the 
productivity ratios that are evaluated at the prices in year 0 and the prices in year 1. The interpretation is as 
follows:   ( TF ;  ) indicates productivity growth (productivity decrease; 
constant productivity).  
1 TFPC > 1 PC < 1 TFPC =
 
The decomposition of TPFC into catching up and technical change is obtained by noting that (using (3)) 
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5 Productivity as defined in (1) is sometimes also referred to as “profitability” (e.g., Balk (2002)). 
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We derive two components of TFPC. The first component captures that TFP change can be the result of 
changes in the distance from the productivity frontier between 0 and 1. This is evaluated as the proportion 
of   over  , which is a measure for efficiency change or catching up with the maximum 
attainable TFP level (defined by the technological productivity frontier) between 0 and 1. The second 
component indicates that TFP growth can also be due to shifts in the technology frontier between 0 and 1 
(i.e., because of technological innovation). The concomitant measure for technical change is calculated as 










Obviously, both catching up and technical change components can take values above and below unity. 
Note that both components may be moving in opposite directions. For example, TFP growth may occur 
because of innovation (i.e., the technical change value is above unity) while relative efficiency deteriorates 
(i.e., the catching up value is below unity), or vice versa. The above decomposition of TFP change is 




                                                            
6 The ratio of   over   (k=0,1) specifically captures technical change insofar as it affects the value of the 




  11 2.3 COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS 
 
The computation of (relative) TFP levels and changes (overall change, catching up and technical change) 
boils down to computing   (j,k=0,1); see (2) and (5). This is relatively easy when the possibility sets 
 and prices (  are known (k=0,1). In our below application, however, we do not have such 
information and, hence, we should approximate   by   (j,k=0,1) on the basis of estimated 




















We proceed as follows. First, the non-parametric approach (e.g., Varian (1984)) suggests to use the 
observed set of input-output vectors as T  (k=0,1). In our application, each such observation corresponds 
to a different country, so that the estimated technological frontier in fact represents the ‘world productivity 
frontier’. In the following, we assume that there are n observed (country) input-output vectors in year 0 and 
1; i.e., T  (k=0,1). Second, we use ‘implicit’ or ‘shadow’ prices for ()  
(k=0,1); i.e., for each country we select those prices that maximize   (j,k=0,1) (or: that ‘minimize’ 
the estimated relative distance of   from the productivity frontier in j). Starting from (3), this gives 
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Using that only the relative input and output prices matter for the outcome of this problem, we can 
equivalently formulate it as 
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which can be expressed in linear programming form as
7  
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Hence, the estimation of   (k=0,1) and TFPC (including its two components) boils down to solving 
four such linear programming problems (i.e., for the different combinations j,k=0,1). This should be 




Two final notes apply with respect to the practical computation of  . First, the dual of the above 
programming problem expresses   as the Shephard (1970) input distance function associated with 
, computed with respect to the convex conical hull of the set T  (i.e., the production possibility 
set construct obtained directly from T  by assuming constant-returns-to-scale and input and output free 













8 This in turns enables to 
 
7 Compare with Charnes et al. (1978), who address a formally similar transformation of a fractional programming 
problem into a linear programming problem. 
8 See Färe et al. (1994) and Cooper et al. (2000) for more recent, general expositions of the nonparametric approach to 
productivity measurement (respectively within an economics and a management science orientation). 
  13 establish the relationship between the Fischer type productivity measurement (adopted here) and the 
Malmquist approach to productivity measurement (see Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982 a,b); after 
Malmquist (1953)). See Färe and Grosskopf (1992). 
 
A final point of attention concerns the fact that we use shadow pricing for approximating the true input and 
output prices. The result is that   imperfectly approximates   (even when abstracting from 
the fact that we approximate T  by T ), which also impacts on the consequent estimate of TFPC. Still, 
resorting to general properties of the Shephard distance functions (which are dual to the  ; see 
above), Balk (1993) argues that the productivity change estimates based on shadow pricing form a 
reasonable approximation for the true values. See also Kuosmanen and Post (2000), who adapt Balk’s 











  14 3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
3.1 PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS AND PRODUCTIVITY CHANGES 
 
Our input and output data are taken from the Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6; see Summers and Heston 
(1991)). We calculate productivity measures for a sample of 57 countries, which consists of 26 OECD 
countries and 31 non-OECD countries, and we consider the years 1975 (i.e., the year after the oil crisis hit) 
to 1990.
9 The two inputs are total employment and capital stock and the output is real GDP. Table A1 
contains for each country the average productivity values (levels and changes) for the period 1975-1990 
and Table A2 the country-specific productivity levels for the initial year 1975.
10 
 
A summary of the TFP results is given in Table 1. The table also includes results for the more conventional 
(level and growth) productivity measures, which refer to the GDP per worker ratios. Apart from a mere 
inspection of the summary statistics for the sample as a whole, it seems interesting to compare the 
computed productivity results for the OECD subsample with those for the non-OECD subsample; see also 
our concluding discussion in Section 4. For that reason, we include the OECD and non-OECD summary 
statistics in Table 1. 
 
                                                            
9 Our sample of countries is determined by the criterion that consistent data were available in the Penn World Tables 
as well as for our institutional infrastructure indicators from other sources. 
10 In Table A1, the fact that Sierra Leona attains a TFP level value of unity may seem peculiar.  Kumar and Russell 
(2002), who obtain a similar result from a similar sample, provide two (complementary) interpretations. (Kumar and 
Russell use the Shephard distance function rather than the relative measure in (8) for capturing productivity; as 
explained in section 2.3, the two approaches are dual to each other.) Their so-called ‘literal’ interpretation is that 
Sierra Leone, one of the poorest countries in the sample, is so poor particularly because it is so much 
undercapitalized. The other interpretation is that the method used for constructing the TFP measures (that directly 
builds on the observed set of countries) fails to fully recover the ‘true’ world technology especially for lower 
capital/labor ratios such as that of Sierra Leone. Still, in our core analysis (in Section 3.4), which deals with the 
determinants of productivity differences, we focus on central tendencies in the computed productivity values. This 
can be expected to ‘average out’ the impact of this kind of ‘estimation error’ effects (e.g., other poorly capitalized 
countries like Madagascar, Malawi and Sri Lanka attain very low TFP values). When the focus were on the 
productivity of individual countries, it would be recommendable to complement the computation of country-specific 
productivity values with statistical inference analysis (see, e.g., Simar and Wilson (2000) for a state-of-the-art survey 
of the tools that could be used, and Simar and Wilson (1999) for an application to the kind of productivity measures 
used in this study). 
  15 We find -not very surprisingly- that OECD countries are generally characterized by higher productivity 
levels. Still, the difference is much less pronounced for the TFP measure (0.774 versus 0.553) than for the 
GDP per worker ratio measure (23135 versus 7996; 1985 US dollars). The reason is that non-OECD 
countries are typically associated with relatively low capital/labor ratios in comparison to OECD countries. 
Therefore it is recommended to take both input dimensions into account when comparing overall 
productivity levels. This is exactly what the TFP level measure does, while the GDP per worker ratio 
solely relates labor stock to the overall output level. 
 
If we then consider productivity changes, we observe that average productivity growth over the period 
1975-1990 was only slightly positive: 0.3% according to the TFP measure; 1.1% according to the GDP per 
worker ratio. Next, we find that average growth was higher in OECD countries than in non-OECD 
countries: 0.9% versus –0.2% for the TFP measure; 1.9% versus 0.5% for the GDP per worker ratio.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, the TFP measure can be further decomposed into changes towards the 
technological frontier (‘efficiency change’ or ‘catching up’), and changes of the technological frontier 
(‘technical change’). We find that the productivity growth of non-OECD countries is mostly realized 
through catching up with the production frontier (on average 0.9%), while the average impact of technical 
change turns out to be even negative (- 1.1%). The interpretation is that, in contrast to OECD countries 
(with average efficiency and technical change respectively 0.6% and 0.4%), the specific input allocation of 
the non-OECD countries in our sample has (on average) a negative effect on overall productivity change, 
due to regress of the associated technology frontier.  This observation is directly related to our earlier 
remark that non-OECD countries are typically characterized by high labor and low capital stocks: we can 
expect a higher capital/labor ratio to be associated with a higher degree of technological innovation.
11 
 
Generally, these results suggest a diverging productivity pattern for OECD countries and non-OECD 
countries. Our following discussion specifically focuses on explaining these differences. Our discussion 
                                                            
11 The results in Kumar and Russell (2002) support this argument. 
  16 concentrates mainly on institutional effects. In addition, we account for possible convergence/divergence 
issues in our analysis of productivity changes. 
 
 
Table 1: Productivity level and productivity change (1975-1990); summary statistics 












GDP per Worker; 
level 
(’85 US prices) 
All  average 1.003  1.008 0.996  1.011    0.654 14901.296 
  st.dev. 0.015  0.016 0.012  0.021    0.219 9614.208 
  min. 0.973  0.975 0.973  0.965    0.225 1145.259 
  max. 1.049  1.056 1.015  1.065    1.000 33220.451 
OECD  average 1.009  1.006 1.004  1.019    0.774 23134.737 
  st.dev. 0.008  0.012 0.011  0.013    0.129 6406.591 
  min. 0.995  0.986 0.977  0.997    0.495 8755.343 
   max. 1.024  1.046 1.015  1.065    1.000 33220.451 
Non-OECD average 0.998  1.009 0.989  1.005    0.553 7995.829 
 st.dev.  0.018  0.019 0.008  0.024    0.229 5505.633 
 min.  0.973  0.975 0.973  0.965    0.225 1145.259 
   max.  1.049  1.056 1.004  1.060    1.000 21620.984 
 
 
3.2 COMPOSITE AND SYNTHETIC INSTITUTIONAL INDICATORS 
 
Our analysis focuses on three dimensions of institutional quality, viz. political stability,  quality of 
government and social infrastructure. To focus our following regression analysis, we represent each 
dimension by a composite indicator, i.e. a combination of single indicators: 
1.  Political stability indicators, including political changes (CONSTCH and POWLOSS), political 
violence (COUPS, RIOTS) and war activity (WAR and WARCIV). 
2.  Quality of government indicators, including black market (BLCK), corruption (CORRUPTI, 
CORRUPTM) and law and order (RULELAW). 
3.  Social infrastructure indicators, including civil liberties (AGOVDEM, DEMOC and PURGES). 
All data for the single indicators are taken from the Easterly and Levine (1997) data set,
12 which are further 
explained in Table 2. 
 
                                                            
12 See http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/ddeale.htm for sources and definitions. 
  17 Table 2: Institutional data 
Category Code  Number of 
observations  Description 
1. Political 
Stability       
  CONSTCHG 53 
Major Constitutional Changes (decade 1980-1989): The number of basic 
alternations in a state's constitutional structure, the extreme case being the 
adoption of a new constitution that significantly alters the prerogatives of the 
various branches of government. 
  COUPS 53 
‘Coups d'Etat’ (decade 1980-1989): The number of extra constitutional or 
forced changes in the top government elite and/or its effective control of the 
nation's power structure in a given year. Unsuccessful coups are not counted. 
  POWLOSS  51  Power losses (decade 1980-1989) 
  RIOTS 52  Riots (decade 1980-1989): Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 
100 citizens involving the use of physical force. 
  WAR  57  Dummy for war on national territory  (decade 1980-1989). 
  WARCIV  57  Dummy for civil war (decade 1980-1989). 
2. Quality of 
Government      
  BLCK 57  Black Market Premium: Log of 1+ black market premium, average (decade 
1980-1989). 
  CORRUPTI (*)  56  Knack and Keefer measure of corruption (1980-89). 
  CORRUPTM (*)   44  Mauro measure of corruption (1980-83). 
  RULELAW  52  Rule of Law: Law and order tradition (decade 1980-1989). 
3. Social capital      
  AGOVDEM 52 
Anti-government demonstrations (decade 1980-1989): Any peaceful public 
gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing 
their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations 
of a distinctly anti-foreign nature. 
  DEMOC (**)  54  Measure of democracy; measured as a subjective measure of political freedom 
(Gastil's Political Rights; decade 1980-1989). 
  PURGES 52  Purges (decade 1980-1989): Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution 
of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposition. 
Notes: (*): Higher values indicate less corruption; (**): lower values indicate a higher degree of democracy. 
 
 
The three composite institutional quality indicators are then constructed in two steps. In a first step, we 
make the values of the different single indicators commensurable. That is, we normalize each indicator on 
a scale from 0 to 1, where higher values can be interpreted as an indication of higher-quality institutions. 
Specifically, for quality indicators where higher values reflect better quality (i.e., indicator = CORRUPTI, 















where subscript ‘min’ refers to the lowest indicator value over all countries that are under study and 
subscript ‘max’ to the highest indicator value; superscript ‘n’ indicates the normalized status of the 
indicator. 
 
  18 Similarly, when higher values indicate worse performance (i.e., indicator ≠ CORRUPTI, CORRUPTM, 
















In a second step, we calculate composite indicators of political stability, government quality and social 
infrastructure as the arithmetic average of the respective single indicators.
14 Apart from a composite 
indicator for each country, we also construct an overall measure for institutional infrastructure as the 
arithmetic average of the three composite indicators. For ease of exposition we will label this overall 
measure as a synthetic indicator. The country values of the synthetic indicator are included in Table A3 in 
the appendix. 
 
It can be argued that a well-defined synthetic indicator should adequately reflect the information captured 
by each of its components; a synthetic indicator should give a ‘balanced’ indication of the ‘aggregate’ 
performance in the different dimensions that are captured. Our synthetic indicator indeed correlates 
strongly with each of its three components: the associated correlation coefficient amounts to 0.816, 0.878 





                                                            
13 Observe that we consider AGOVDEM as a ‘bad’; it captures the extent to which government policy does not 
account for the different tendencies in the public opinion. Of course, as it comprises peaceful demonstrations it could 
also be interpreted a ‘good’. Still, we believe its interpretation as institutional bad counterweights its interpretation as 
an institutional good; the second interpretation would be more appropriate if the measure were expressed as a 
proportion of all  (peaceful and violent) demonstrations. 
14 We are confronted with missing data for a number of single indicators. In such cases, we compute a composite 
indicator by taking the arithmetic average of those (normalized) single indicators for which data are available for the 
evaluated country. 
15 On a similar basis, we can conclude that the three composite indicators do well reflect the information captured by 
each of their components (i.e. basic single indicators): for all but one single indicator the correlation coefficient is 
above 0.5; in most cases, it is above 0.75. (The one correlation coefficient that is below 0.5 is that between 
POWLOSS and the composite quality of government indicator, which amounts to 0.369.) 
  19 3.3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
In our following regressions, we hypothesize a structural model that is formally similar to that of Hall and 
Jones (1999). An attractive feature of that model is that it is parsimonious; it only includes the institutional 
infrastructure to explain differences in productivity performance. Using instrumental variables, we account 
for the possible problem of ‘reverse causality’; i.e., while it can reasonably be expected that institutions 
affect the productivity performance, it can also be argued that productivity impacts on institutional quality. 
 
We first consider the model for productivity levels. Let ProdMea represent the productivity level measure 
(GDP per worker level or TFP level) and InstInd the institutional indicator (institutional infrastructure, 
political stability, quality of government or social infrastructure). We get the following structural model: 
 
(21)    ProdMea     InstInd   αβ γ =+ +
and 
(22)  ,  InstInd     ProdMea  X δε ς η =+ + +
 
where  X  comprises three instrumental variables: ethnolinguistic fractionalization, a dummy for Sub-
Saharan Africa and a dummy for Latin America and the Caribbean. Again, these variables are taken from 
Easterly and Levine (1997).
16 
 
In the case where ProdMea stands for a productivity change measure (GDP per worker change, TFP 
change, technical change or catching up) we additionally control for the initial productivity level 
(respectively GDP per worker or TFP level in 1975; see Table A2) in our regressions. Conveniently, this 
allows us to check the convergence hypothesis not only for the overall TFP measure but also for its 
technical and efficiency change components. For example, as discussed in the introduction, it could well be 
that efficiency change is associated with convergence (countries with lower initial productivity realize 
                                                            
16 Our measure for ethnolinguistic fractionalization is AVELF in the Easterly and Levine dataset. 
  20 higher productivity growth through catching up) while technical change corresponds to divergence 
(countries with higher initial productivity realize higher productivity growth through innovation). 
 
Our results are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5.
17 To keep our discussion focused, we restrict our comparison 
to the coefficients of the alternative institutional indicators and the determination coefficients associated 
with the different regressions. In our regressions for productivity change (see Tables 4 and 5) we also 
include the coefficient values associated with the initial productivity levels. 
 
Recall that we expect a stronger relationship for the GDP per worker measures than for the TFP measures. 
The results in Table 3 confirm this a priori hypothesis: for all four institutional indicators the coefficient 
and R² values associated with the GDP per worker level are (often considerably) higher than those 
corresponding to the TFP level measure. This finding reflects the fact that in the regression with the TFP 
level only the accommodation effect plays, whereas in the GDP per worker regressions also the 
accumulation effect shows up on top of the accommodation effect. It is interesting to note that we find 
convincing evidence for the existence of an accommodation effect: the coefficient associated with the 
institutional variables is everywhere significantly different from zero for the TFP level measure. 
 
Interestingly, we find a similar pattern for productivity changes: institutional quality impacts on 
productivity change to a greater extent when the latter is measured as the change of the GDP per worker 
ratio. Again, this is evidenced by the size of the coefficient values as well as the R²; see Table 4. This 
means that also for productivity changes there appears to be some ‘superadditionality’ of the 
accommodation and the accumulation channel running from institutional quality. 
 
The results in that table also allow us to check the convergence hypothesis, which in the standard case 
predicts a negative sign of the estimated coefficient for the initial productivity level. In only 4 out of the 8 
                                                            
17 We divided the GDP per worker ratio of each country by the maximum value in the sample (i.e., associated with the 
US) so as to obtain (relative) productivity values between 0 and 1; compare with (3) in section 2.1. This also yields 
that the coefficients of the different institutional indicators for our GDP per worker (level) regressions are more 
directly comparable to those for the TFP (level) regressions. 
  21 regressions the negative coefficient differs significantly from zero (at the 10% level). In one case it is 
significantly positive (i.e., where we use social infrastructure as the institutional indicator), which itself 
suggests divergence rather than convergence. These findings lead us to mixed conclusions; seemingly, our 
results for the overall productivity change measures rather weakly support convergence. 
 
Table 3: Institutional infrastructure and levels of productivity 
Dependent variable  GDP per worker level  
(average, 1975-1990) 







    
0.659 
(0.221) 
   
p-value  0.000      0.000     
Political stability   2.527 
(0.477) 
    0.953 
(0.424) 
  
p-value   0.000      0.000    
Quality of 
government 
   
0.970 
(0.152) 




p-value     0.000      0.000  
Social infrastructure      3.804 
(0.734) 
    1.448 
(0.056) 
p-value      0.000      0.000 
R2  0.451 0.338 0.425 0.341 0.140 0.084 0.128 0.086 
# Observations  57 57 57 54 57 57 57 54 
Instrumental 
variables 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, a dummy for Africa and a dummy for Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Notes: Each column contains the regression results for the institutional indicator in the corresponding row; standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients are between brackets;  “p-value” stands for the probability that the coefficient equals zero under normality. 
 
Table 4: Institutional infrastructure and productivity changes 
Dependent variable  GDP per worker change 
(average, 1975-1990) 
Total factor productivity change 
(average, 1975-1990) 
Initial productivity  -0.023 -0.015 -0.011 0.227 -0.014 -0.012 -0.015 -0.007 
   (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.067) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
p-value  0.021 0.135 0.270 0.001 0.073 0.150 0.043 0.329 
Institutional 
infrastructure  0.148           0.084          
   (0.028)           (0.018)          
p-value  0.000           0.000          
Political stability     0.179           0.109       
      (0.043)           (0.028)       
p-value     0.000           0.000       
Quality of 
Government        0.083           0.047    
         (0.014)           (0.009)    
p-value        0.000           0.000    
Social infrastructure           0.227           0.119 
            (0.067)           (0.041) 
p-value           0.001           0.005 
R²  0.352 0.252 0.410 0.191 0.280 0.216 0.329 0.143 
# Observations  57 57 57 54 57 57 57 54 
Instrumental 
variables 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, a dummy for Africa and a dummy for Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Notes: Each column contains the regression results for the institutional indicator in the corresponding row; standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients are between brackets;  “p-value” stands for the probability that the coefficient equals zero under normality. 
  22  
A further decomposition of TFP changes in catching up and technical change may clarify this issue. 
Indeed, Table 5 suggests an unambiguous convergence-divergence pattern. Specifically, catching up leads 
to convergence in the sense that a lower initial TFP level endorses a higher degree of catching up; we 
obtain a significantly negative regression coefficient for initial productivity. One possible explanation is 
that the public good character of technological knowledge tends to favor less advanced countries, i.e., 
countries that are initially situated far from the technological frontier. By contrast, technological change 
leads to divergence. High initial TFP facilitates a higher degree of technological change or innovation-
driven productivity progress; see the significantly positive regression coefficient. One potential 
rationalization is that a higher degree of experience with technological innovation (i.e., a closer situation to 
the technological productivity frontier) benefits the implementation of new products and processes (e.g., 
the cost of additional innovations falls). These results at least suggest that disentangling productivity 
change into catching-up and innovation components may provide a reasonable explanation for the mixed 
evidence regarding the convergence issue that is hitherto obtained.
18 
 
Table 5 also allows us to further anatomize the institutional accommodation effect, which is our main 
concern. Our findings show a positive relationship between institutional infrastructure and technical 
change; high quality institutional designs enhance the shifting of the frontier, as revealed by the 
significantly positive regression coefficient for the institutional variables. Apparently, product- and 
                                                            
18 We note the difference between these findings and those obtained by Kumar and Russell (2002), who check the 
convergence-divergence pattern on a two-year basis (1965 and 1990), by relating the different productivity change 
measures to the initial GDP per worker level. In contrast to our findings, these authors locate convergence in terms of 
overall TFP change but not in terms of efficiency change, while equally obtaining divergence in terms of technical 
change; see their Figure 4. Note that our results in Table 5 are based on the initial TFP level rather than the GDP per 
worker level; it seems more natural to control for initial TFP given the focus of our study. Still, we obtain the same 
qualitative convergence-divergence conclusions on the basis of correlation tests (at 1%, 5% or 10% significance 
levels) where we relate overall TFP change, catching up and technical change to the 1975 GDP per worker level. 
(These results are not reported but can be reconstructed from the data in Tables A1 and A2.) We see at least two 
possible explanations for the difference between the Kumar and Russell findings and ours: (i) Kumar and Russell 
consider the period 1965-1990 while we consider the period 1975-1990 (i.e., after the oil crisis hit); (ii) the Kumar 
and Russell productivity results are obtained on a two-years basis while we use (geometric) average productivity 
change estimates over all years between 1975 and 1990 (in our opinion, the use of average values seems 
recommendable because of the sensitivity of the nonparametric productivity measures for extreme data values, which 
may be due to measurement errors). A more detailed investigation falls beyond the scope of this study but it may 
constitute an interesting avenue for follow-up research. Such investigation may also include a (counterfactual) 
distribution analysis similar to that of Kumar and Russell, to account for the criticism (most notably by Quah (e.g., 
1997)) on the type of regression-based convergence-divergence analysis adopted here. 
  23 process-innovations blossom when private rewards are protected and market preservation institutions 
prevail. Interestingly, we find a similar positive effect for the efficiency change measure. (In this case, 
especially the political stability and the government quality seem to matter; social infrastructure is not 
significant at the 10% level.) Hence, the aforementioned catching up effect becomes even stronger in the 
case of a high-quality institutional environment.
19 
 
As a concluding exercise, we can be interested in the type of institutions that are particularly important to 
ensure high productivity. More specifically, is it a high-quality government, political stability or a well-
developed social infrastructure that exhibits the ‘most significant’ relationship with our economic 
performance measures? We choose the determination coefficient as our base of comparison between the 
different composite indicators. The reason is that a direct comparison of coefficient values is difficult, 
since each composite indicator captures alternatively defined single indicators. Also, the R² values tell us to 
what extent productivity variation can be explained by variation in each institutional indicator, which 
seems to constitute an appropriate ‘importance’ criterion.  
 
Interestingly, we discern a grossly similar pattern for each productivity measure (change or level): our 
quality of government indicator always turns out to be associated with the highest R² value, followed by 
political stability and social infrastructure, in that order. This finding indicates that, also from the point of 
view of economic prosperity, the importance of high quality government can hardly be denied. Good 
government institutions enhance the accumulation as well as the accommodation (both in terms of catching 
up and technical change) of the production factors. 
 
                                                            
19 See Evans (2001) for an interesting discussion of the adequacy of ‘institutional monocropping’ for countries in the 
catching-up phase. 
  24 Table 5: Institutional infrastructure and catching up versus technical change 




Initial productivity  -0.041 -0.039 -0.042 -0.035 0.026  0.027  0.026  0.027 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
p-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Institutional 
infrastructure  0.051           0.033          
   (0.019)           (0.013)          
p-value  0.008           0.015          
Political stability     0.063           0.047       
      (0.028)           (0.020)       
p-value     0.030           0.022       
Quality of 
Government        0.029           0.018    
         (0.009)           (0.007)    
p-value        0.003           0.010    
Social infrastructure           0.071           0.049 
            (0.040)           (0.030) 
p-value           0.084           0.116 
R²  0.353 0.325 0.373 0.313 0.415 0.408 0.423 0.386 
# Observations  57 57 57 54 57 57 57 54 
Instrumental 
variables 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, a dummy for Africa and a dummy for Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Notes: Each column contains the regression results for  the institutional indicator in the corresponding row; standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients are between brackets;  “p-value” stands for  the probability that the coefficient equals zero under normality. 
 
  25 4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
 
We have analyzed the relationship between institutional infrastructure (political stability, quality of 
government, social infrastructure) and overall country productivity. Deviating from the existing literature, 
our analysis has concentrated on the explained variable (i.e., country productivity) rather than on the 
explaining variable (i.e., country institutions). Specifically, we have compared results for productivity 
measures that account only for the labor stock (i.e., output per worker ratios) with those for measures that 
incorporate both the labor stock and the capital stock (i.e., TFP measures). We have argued that an analysis 
based on the former type of measures includes both the accumulation and accommodation effect of the 
institutional infrastructure, whereas a TFP based analysis singles out the accommodation effect. Also, the 
study of convergence/divergence in terms of catching up and technical change separately may clarify –at 
least to some extent- the convergence debate. 
 
Our empirical findings suggest a significant combined accumulation and accommodation effect, which 
falls in line with the existing literature. More interestingly, our evidence also supports a significant 
accommodation effect. In other words, better institutions do not only attract more investments, they also 
contribute to ‘fine-tuning’ the coordination of the available capital and labor stock (e.g., by facilitating 
economic transactions). This ‘superadditionality’ of the accumulation and the accommodation channel 
seems to hold for productivity levels as well as for productivity changes. A further decomposition of the 
institutional impact on productivity changes reveals that good institutions stimulate catching up as well as 
innovative activities. When looking at the effect of the different components of our overall institutional 
infrastructure measure (political stability, government quality and social infrastructure), we identify a 
particularly strong case for instituting a high-quality government, which is here quantified in terms of a 
low black market premium, a low degree of corruption and a well-established tradition of law and order. 
That is, variation in government quality explains for a considerable deal observed variation in productivity 
performance (in terms of TFP levels, TFP changes, efficiency changes as well as technical changes).  
 
  26 Our analysis mainly focused on the factor accommodation effect of good institutions; the factor (in 
particular capital) accumulation effect was treated as the difference between the overall effect (captured by 
the GDP per worker measures) and the accommodation effect (captured by the TFP measures). A more 
detailed investigation of this accumulation effect seems like a rewarding avenue for follow-up research. 
For example, we have related the generally higher technical change values for OECD-countries (as 
compared to non-OECD countries) to typically higher capital-labor ratios. This suggests investigating the 
determinants of the capital-intensity of an economy as a useful step towards a more complete 
understanding of overall productivity performance. 
 
As an interesting by-product, our TFP construct allows us to investigate the convergence issue for the 
catching up and technical change components of TFP change. Attractively, our results suggest a 
particularly clear convergence-divergence pattern. First, catching up is characterized by convergence: a 
lower initial TFP level generally implies a higher degree of catching up; less productive countries have 
more possibility for getting closer to the world frontier, and may benefit more from technological 
diffusion. By contrast, technical change is associated with divergence: an initial situation that is closer to 
the world frontier in general implies a higher degree of innovation-driven productivity growth; innovation 
investments may have a greater pay-off for countries with more innovation experience, i.e. countries that 
are situated more closely to the world productivity frontier. In our opinion, this convergence-divergence 
pattern may provide a plausible explanation for the by and large mixed nature of the existing evidence on 
convergence phenomena across countries and regions; see also our own evidence for a combined 
productivity change measure (GDP per worker and overall TFP growth). Since the convergence-
divergence issue does not constitute the core focus of the current study, we have refrained from a further 
in-depth investigation of these relationships (e.g., including a robustness analysis).
20 But at least our results 
indicate that such study may constitute a valuable avenue for follow-up research. 
 
                                                            
20 Also, it is worth to stress that our results pertain to convergence-divergence in TFP and not in income (measured, 
e.g., by GDP per capita or GDP per worker). Kumar and Russell (2002) employ similarly constructed productivity 
measures to investigate convergence-divergence in terms of income differences. See also footnote 17, where we relate 
their results to ours. 
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  29 APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Productivity level and productivity change (1975-1990, averages); country values 
   COUNTRY TFP  change  catching up  technical change 
GDP per 
worker; change  TFP level 
GDP per worker; 
level ('85 US 
prices) 
OECD  AUSTRALIA 1.010  0.996  1.014 1.010  0.845 28074.516 
   AUSTRIA 0.999  0.997  1.003  1.017 0.733  23488.933 
   BELGIUM 1.016  1.003  1.014  1.016 0.831  27600.509 
   CANADA 1.013  0.999  1.014  1.014  0.888  29519.588 
   DENMARK 1.006  1.001  1.005  1.014  0.690  22677.584 
   FINLAND 1.024  1.010  1.015  1.025  0.684  22802.575 
   FRANCE 1.013  1.001  1.013  1.016  0.817  27056.149 
   GERMANY WEST  1.016  1.001  1.015  1.016  0.810  26942.938 
   GREECE 1.006  1.007  0.999  1.018  0.572  15729.547 
   ICELAND 0.999  1.006  0.993  1.021 0.947  22627.232 
   IRELAND 1.016  1.018  0.998  1.030 0.721  18889.610 
   ITALY 1.011  1.010  1.001  1.026  0.842  26680.811 
   JAPAN 1.010  1.010  1.000  1.036  0.571  17558.647 
   KOREA REP.  1.021  1.046  0.977  1.065  0.495  9974.920 
   LUXEMBOURG 1.024 1.008  1.015  1.024  0.913  30459.157 
   MEXICO 1.003  1.002  1.000  1.002  0.752  16803.469 
   NETHERLANDS 1.004 0.997  1.006  1.009  0.882  28869.732 
   NEW ZEALAND  0.995  0.986  1.009  0.997  0.773  25447.474 
   NORWAY 1.020  1.005  1.015  1.020 0.791  26341.043 
   PORTUGAL 1.011  1.030  0.982 1.032  0.679 12027.449 
   SPAIN 0.997  0.999  0.998  1.016  0.802  22123.037 
   SWEDEN 1.008  0.995  1.014  1.009 0.778  25825.522 
   SWITZERLAND 1.009 0.994  1.015  1.009  0.882  29310.741 
   TURKEY 1.000  1.022  0.979  1.025  0.533  8755.343 
   U.K. 1.008  1.010  0.998  1.020  0.898  22696.180 
   U.S.A. 1.008  1.000  1.008  1.013  1.000  33220.451 
non-OECD ARGENTINA 0.984  0.991  0.992  0.988  0.772  15758.652 
   BOLIVIA  0.996  1.019  0.977  0.999  0.404  6195.470 
   CHILE  1.004  1.025  0.980  1.018  0.675  10448.392 
   COLOMBIA  1.008  1.015  0.993  1.013  0.431  8691.272 
   DOMINICAN REP.  0.976  0.991  0.985  0.998  0.619  7513.844 
   ECUADOR  0.990  0.994  0.996  1.003  0.426  9917.131 
   GUATEMALA  0.993  1.007  0.987  1.001  0.763  8204.176 
   HONDURAS  1.005  1.025  0.980  1.004  0.412  4959.146 
   HONG KONG  1.049  1.056  0.994  1.058  0.788  15937.888 
   INDIA  1.021  1.022  0.999  1.030  0.337  2558.988 
   ISRAEL  1.009  1.008  1.001  1.011  0.773  21620.984 
   JAMAICA  0.993  1.015  0.978  0.977  0.475  5478.373 
   KENYA  1.003  1.003  1.000  0.999  0.296  2055.021 
   MADAGASCAR  0.984  0.990  0.994  0.984  0.225  1766.543 
   MALAWI  1.002  1.019  0.984  1.007  0.269  1145.259 
    MAURITIUS 1.007  1.016  0.991 1.027  0.887  8107.637 
   MOROCCO  1.013  1.020  0.993  1.016  0.739  6498.021 
   NIGERIA  0.978  0.975  1.004  0.975  0.468  3018.966 
   PANAMA  0.994  0.994  0.999  0.995  0.386  9324.606 
   PARAGUAY  0.996  1.000  0.996  1.016  1.000  6413.921 
   PERU  0.973  0.986  0.988  0.972  0.499  8914.148 
   PHILIPPINES  1.000  1.015  0.986  1.004  0.446  4736.452 
  30    SIERRA LEONE  0.973  1.000  0.973  0.990  1.000  2737.387 
   SRI LANKA  1.019  1.040  0.980  1.033  0.290  4244.973 
   SYRIA  0.992  0.998  0.994  1.005  0.723  16524.931 
   TAIWAN  1.026  1.033  0.992  1.060  0.489  12355.174 
   THAILAND  1.025  1.034  0.992  1.048  0.449  4698.631 
   VENEZUELA  0.977  0.977  1.000  0.979  0.780  20992.160 
    YUGOSLAVIA 0.976  0.993 0.983  1.002  0.783  11367.188 
   ZAMBIA  0.980  0.992  0.988  0.965  0.318  2696.270 
   ZIMBABWE  1.001  1.026  0.976  0.981  0.225  2989.101 
 
 
Table A2: Productivity levels (1975); country values 
   COUNTRY TFP  level 
GDP per worker; 
level ('85 US 
prices) 
OECD  AUSTRALIA  0.862 25988.876 
   AUSTRIA  0.765 20638.826 
   BELGIUM  0.825 24858.805 
   CANADA  0.901 26746.930 
   DENMARK  0.689 20250.716 
   FINLAND  0.654 19697.669 
   FRANCE  0.816 23817.254 
   GERMANY WEST  0.775 23342.000 
   GREECE  0.536 13531.925 
   ICELAND  0.796 18345.850 
   IRELAND  0.644 15469.522 
   ITALY  0.767 21359.259 
   JAPAN  0.530 13380.832 
   KOREA REP.  0.312 6244.991 
   LUXEMBOURG  0.885 26661.970 
   MEXICO  0.710 16265.909 
   NETHERLANDS  0.919 27420.618 
   NEW ZEALAND  0.866 25970.864 
   NORWAY  0.725 21851.026 
   PORTUGAL  0.498 10354.547 
   SPAIN  0.839 20723.037 
   SWEDEN  0.830 24795.123 
   SWITZERLAND  0.898 27073.681 
   TURKEY  0.430 7586.928 
   U.K.  0.814 19841.941 
   U.S.A.  1.000 30133.100 
non-OECD ARGENTINA  0.737 16045.499 
   BOLIVIA  0.315 5908.987 
   CHILE  0.448 9185.760 
   COLOMBIA  0.350 7697.611 
   DOMINICAN REP.  0.582 7104.673 
   ECUADOR  0.404 8896.291 
   GUATEMALA  0.672 7644.129 
   HONDURAS  0.290 4394.115 
   HONG KONG  0.444 9729.864 
   INDIA  0.296 2068.234 
   ISRAEL  0.748 20237.391 
   JAMAICA  0.405 7149.113 
   KENYA  0.284 1944.481 
  31    MADAGASCAR  0.240 2009.053 
   MALAWI  0.251 1089.038 
   MAURITIUS  0.767 7001.018 
   MOROCCO  0.646 5550.105 
   NIGERIA  0.585 3065.607 
   PANAMA  0.362 8702.993 
   PARAGUAY  1.000 5070.521 
   PERU  0.490 10485.296 
   PHILIPPINES  0.370 4457.748 
   SIERRA LEONE  1.000 3007.219 
   SRI LANKA  0.175 3090.841 
   SYRIA  0.679 14802.777 
   TAIWAN  0.363 7727.582 
   THAILAND  0.345 3371.338 
   VENEZUELA  0.931 23760.142 
   YUGOSLAVIA  0.653 9704.000 
   ZAMBIA  0.336 3637.446 
   ZIMBABWE  0.159 3257.122 
 
 
Table A3: Synthetic and composite indicators of institutional quality; country values 
   synthetic  political stability  quality of government  social capital 
ARGENTINA 0.681  0.777  0.546  0.722 
AUSTRALIA 0.982  0.989  0.958  1.000 
AUSTRIA 0.965  0.993  0.902  1.000 
BELGIUM 0.934  0.830  0.972  1.000 
BOLIVIA 0.538  0.779  0.236  0.600 
CANADA 0.996  0.989  0.998  1.000 
CHILE 0.698  0.613  0.758  0.722 
COLOMBIA 0.671  0.603  0.465  0.944 
DENMARK 0.990  0.993  0.976  1.000 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  0.787  0.897  0.520  0.944 
ECUADOR 0.816  0.947  0.558  0.944 
FINLAND 0.975  0.996  0.983  0.944 
FRANCE 0.988  0.993  0.970  1.000 
GERMANY, WEST  0.959  0.993  0.924   
GREECE 0.846  0.986  0.608  0.944 
GUATEMALA 0.569  0.609  0.321  0.778 
HONDURAS 0.668  0.929  0.243  0.833 
HONG KONG  0.926  0.950  0.901   
ICELAND 0.999  1.000  0.997  1.000 
INDIA 0.530  0.447  0.531  0.611 
IRELAND 0.961  0.982  0.901  1.000 
ISRAEL 0.846  1.000  0.660  0.878 
ITALY 0.899  0.986  0.766  0.944 
JAMAICA 0.624  0.578  0.351  0.944 
JAPAN 0.944  1.000  0.920  0.911 
KENYA 0.728  0.957  0.448  0.778 
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF  0.348  0.231  0.536  0.278 
LUXEMBOURG 0.999  1.000  0.996  1.000 
MADAGASCAR 0.790  0.954  0.693  0.722 
MALAWI 0.703  0.947  0.439  0.722 
MAURITIUS 0.951  0.965  0.945  0.944 
MEXICO 0.790  0.968  0.512  0.889 
  32 MOROCCO 0.737  0.965  0.412  0.833 
NETHERLANDS 0.999  1.000  0.998  1.000 
NEW ZEALAND  0.992  0.979  0.998  1.000 
NIGERIA 0.536  0.500  0.162  0.944 
NORWAY 0.997  0.993  0.998  1.000 
PANAMA 0.669  0.762  0.413  0.833 
PARAGUAY 0.650  0.957  0.215  0.778 
PERU 0.618  0.450  0.459  0.944 
PHILIPPINES 0.523  0.613  0.328  0.628 
PORTUGAL 0.903  0.975  0.789  0.944 
SIERRA LEONE  0.637  0.887  0.246  0.778 
SPAIN 0.887  0.970  0.779  0.911 
SRI LANKA  0.696  0.617  0.526  0.944 
SWEDEN 0.990  0.993  0.976  1.000 
SWITZERLAND 0.992  0.977  0.998  1.000 
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC  0.366  0.371  0.049  0.678 
TAIWAN, CHINA  0.715  1.000  0.813  0.333 
THAILAND 0.775  0.975  0.461  0.889 
TURKEY 0.520  0.223  0.558  0.778 
UNITED KINGDOM  0.984  0.986  0.967  1.000 
UNITED STATES  0.982  0.982  0.964  1.000 
VENEZUELA 0.796  0.950  0.438  1.000 
YUGOSLAVIA 0.769  1.000  0.538   
ZAMBIA 0.629  0.816  0.292  0.778 
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